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Design/methodology approach – The comparison of the two procedures is by rational argument and 
forms the theoretical first half of the paper. In the applied second half of the paper, three recent articles 
from the Journal of Marketing (JM) that introduce new constructs and measures are criticized and 
corrected from the C-OAR-SE perspective. 
Findings – The C-OAR-SE method differs from Churchill’s method by arguing for: total emphasis on 
achieving high content validity of the item(s) and answer scale – without which nothing else matters; use 
of single-item measures for “basic” constructs andfor the first-order components of “abstract” constructs; 
abandonment of the “reflective” measurement model, along with its associated statistical techniques of 
factor analysis and coefficient alpha, arguing that all abstract constructs must be measured as 
“formative”; and abandonment of external validation methods, notably multitrait-multimethod analysis 
(MTMM) and structural equation modeling (SEM), to be replaced by internal content-validation of the 
measure itself. TheC-OAR-SE method can be applied – as demonstrated in the last part of the article – by 
anyverbally intelligent researcher.However,less confident researchersmayneedtoseek the assistance of 
one or two colleagues who fully understand the new method. 
Practical implications – If a measure is not highly content-valid to begin with – and none of the new 
measures in the JM articles criticized is highly content-valid – then no subsequent psychometric 
properties can save it. Highly content-valid measures are absolutely necessary for proper tests of theories 
and hypotheses, and for obtaining trustworthy findings in marketing. 
Originality/value – C-OAR-SE is completely original and Rossiter’s updated version should be followed. C-
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Marketing measurement revolution: the C-OAR-SE 
method and why it must replace psychometrics 
 
Abstract 
Purpose – New measures in marketing are invariably created by using a psychometric 
approach based on Churchill’s (1979) “scale development” procedure.  This paper 
compares and contrasts Churchill’s procedure with Rossiter’s (2002b; 2010) content-
validity approach to measurement, called C-OAR-SE. 
 
Design/methodology approach – The comparison of the two procedures is by rational 
argument and forms the theoretical first half of the paper.  In the applied second half 
of the paper, three recent articles from the Journal of Marketing that introduce new 
constructs and measures are criticized and corrected from the C-OAR-SE perspective. 
 
Findings – The C-OAR-SE method differs from Churchill’s method by arguing for (1) 
total emphasis on achieving high content validity of the item(s) and answer scale – 
without which nothing else matters; (2) use of single-item measures for “basic” 
constructs and for the first-order components of “abstract” constructs; (3) 
abandonment of the “reflective” measurement model, along with its associated 
statistical techniques of factor analysis and coefficient alpha, arguing that all abstract 
constructs must be measured as “formative”; and (4) abandonment of external 
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validation methods, notably multitrait-multimethod analysis (MTMM) and structural 
equation modeling (SEM), to be replaced by internal content-validation of the 
measure itself.  The C-OAR-SE method can be applied – as demonstrated in the last 
part of the article – by any verbally intelligent researcher.  However, less confident 
researchers may need to seek the assistance of one or two colleagues who fully 
understand the new method. 
 
Practical implications – If a measure is not highly-content valid to begin with – and 
none of the new measures in the JM articles criticized is highly content-valid – then 
no subsequent psychometric properties can save it.  Highly content-valid measures 
are absolutely necessary for proper tests of theories and hypotheses, and for obtaining 
trustworthy findings in marketing. 
 
Originality/value – C-OAR-SE is completely original and Rossiter’s updated (2010) 
version should be followed.  C-OAR-SE is leading the necessary marketing 
measurement revolution. 
 
Keywords  Construct definition, Content validity, Reliability, Marketing knowledge 
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1.  Introduction 
 Marketing knowledge, which consists of strategic principles, planning 
frameworks, and generalizations from empirical findings – (see Rossiter, 2001, 2002a), 
depends on – and indeed takes as a given – that the constructs involved have been 
validly measured.  Valid measures are assumed to be produced if researchers follow 
and meet the criteria spelled out in Churchill’s (1979) “scale-development” procedure, 
which is based on Nunnally’s (1978) version of psychometric theory.  However, 
Churchill’s method is dangerously misleading because it bypasses the first and 
fundamental requirement of the measure – content validity – and researchers 
following it try to “prop up” and justify low content-valid measures by claiming that 
the scores from these measures meet widely agreed statistical criteria.  The measure is 
then assumed by researchers to be “valid” because it produces scores that have “good 
psychometric properties,” all the while forgetting to ensure that the measure was 
content-valid to begin with.  Typical examples of this cavalier (and unscientific) 
practice in our leading journal, the Journal of Marketing, are given in the second half 
of this article.  The purpose of these critiques of psychometrically trained researchers’ 
work is to dramatize the need for a complete “revolution” in marketing measurement. 
Leading this revolution is the C-OAR-SE method (see Rossiter, 2002b, 2005, 
2007, 2008, 2009a, and 2010).  C-OAR-SE is an acronym for its six procedural steps of 
Construct definition, Object representation, Attribute classification, Rater-entity 
identification, Scale (item type and answer format) selection, and Enumeration 
(scoring).  C-OAR-SE is based on expert content-validation and does not use 
psychometrics or statistics. 
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 The first part of the article argues in detail that the C-OAR-SE approach to 
measurement is incompatible with Churchill’s approach and proves rationally that 
C-OAR-SE should be used instead.  The first table in the article provides a side-by-
side comparison of Churchill’s (1979) measure-development procedure and the 
updated C-OAR-SE procedure (see Rossiter’s 2010 book – although the main updates 
are summarized in the present article).  An explanation of the main differences 
between the two methods is given in the accompanying text.  The C-OAR-SE measure 
evaluation criteria are then reviewed as a prelude to the second part of the article, 
which scrutinizes the definitions and measures of new constructs in recent JM articles 
from the C-OAR-SE perspective.  The objective purpose of the critiques is to 
demonstrate how marketing knowledge is misleadingly inferred when low content-
valid measures are employed.  The subjective purpose, as mentioned, is to give young 
researchers the confidence to adopt C-OAR-SE and lead a measurement revolution. 
 
2.  Comparison of the Churchill and C-OAR-SE procedures 
 
2.1  Different focus of the two procedures 
Understanding of the major difference in focus of the two measurement 
procedures is helped considerably if you first look at the general structure-of-
measurement model (see Figure 1).  This model reveals the crucial difference in the 
coverage of the two procedures and also reveals the source of the problems with 
conventional psychometrics.  Churchill’s procedure (and likewise Nunnally’s 1978 
procedure) covers only the “back end” (M → S) of this Construct → Measure → Score 
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model – it attempts to validate the measure, M, by the scores, S, that it produces.  In 
Churchill’s theory of measurement, as in Nunnally’s, the measure is regarded as 
“validated” if it yields scores that correlate highly with scores from another measure 
of the construct (convergent validity) but at the same time yields scores that do not 
correlate significantly with scores from a measure of another construct (discriminant 
validity).  Churchill (1979), as does Nunnally (1978), refers to this convergent and 
divergent correlational procedure as establishing “construct validity.”  However, the 
construct, C, is in fact ignored, because the focus is on M and S only. 
 
Figure 1 here 
  
In the C-OAR-SE theory of measurement, a measure’s scores are completely 
irrelevant to establishing the measure’s validity (as too are all empirical or statistical 
tests).  In C-OAR-SE, the validity of the measure is established solely by rational 
analysis – performable, for all but the deepest psychological constructs rarely used in 
marketing, by any verbally intelligent expert speaker of the language or, for less 
confident researchers or those who are not native speakers of the language in the 
measure, by enlisting the aid of one or two verbally intelligent expert speakers – of 
the semantic correspondence between the construct, C, as defined by the researcher, and 
the measure, M.  The focus in C-OAR-SE is on C and M only.  This rational analysis 
must demonstrate high content validity for the measure.  Otherwise, the measure must 
not be used.  What happens all too often at present with researchers who use 
Churchill’s (or Nunnally’s) procedure, as explained later in this article, is that items 
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are added or dropped until the “alpha” is pushed up high enough to justify use of the 
measure.  Incidentally, it is hardly ever at the α = .80 minimum to .95 maximum as 
recommended by Nunnally (1978, pp. 245-246) for a “final” measure.  For example, 
all three studies criticized later in this article used multiple-item measures with alphas 
below .80.  In C-OAR-SE, the “alpha” of the measure is irrelevant.  No ex post 
statistical manipulations of the items’ scores can compensate for low content validity 
of the measure. 
The focus of C-OAR-SE theory is thus on the “front end” (C → M) of the 
Construct → Measure → Score model.  The psychometric “back end” (M → S) is 
immaterial and, much worse, misleading.  Failure to understand the different focus of 
the two measurement methods has led editors and reviewers – for example at JM and 
also JMR – to regularly request that the present author “prove empirically” that 
C-OAR-SE produces more valid measures; in other words, they want the author to 
prove that C-OAR-SE is superior by using the very procedure that it is designed to 
replace!  That’s both philosophically (logically) impossible and it’s beside the point, 
because Churchill’s procedure is anyway fatally flawed.  C-OAR-SE theory is based 
on rational analysis.  As with mathematics and logic, to ask for empirical proof is to 
ask for the unnecessary, and to demand that C-OAR-SE theory be justified by any 
empirical method, such as psychometrics or statistics, is to miss the purpose and value 
of the new procedure. 
 
2.2  Detailed comparison 
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A detailed comparison of Churchill’s method and the C-OAR-SE method is 
provided in a summary table (Table 1).  The main differences are explained in the 
remaining sections of the first part of this article.   
 
Table 1 here 
 
 
2.3  Measurement theory comparison 
 The Churchill and C-OAR-SE methods differ fundamentally in their 
assumptions about measurement theory.  As indicated in the table, the differences 
pertain to their respectively underlying true-score theories, their scope of application, 
and the way they define and assess validity and reliability.   
 True-score theory.  Churchill’s (and also Nunnally’s) measurement theory claims 
to be based on what may be called the “revised” true-score model, which is Observed 
score = True score + Systematic error + Random error (Churchill, 1979, p. 65).  
However, the second term in this model, “systematic error,” is not clearly defined by 
Churchill and neither is it referred to subsequently in his article.  In effect, his 
measurement procedure falls back on the “old,” or “classical test-theory,” true-score 
model (see Spearman, 1904, and Lord and Novick, 1968) in which there is no term 
called “systematic error.”  The “old” true-score model is Observed score = True score 
+ Random error, where “random error” (deviations from the true score) is attributed 
entirely to transient and presumably randomly occurring mistakes made by the rater.  
Churchill’s methods of establishing validity and reliability (see below) depend on 
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correlations of the scores, and the correlation statistic is based on the “old” true-score 
model in which there is only “random error.” 
C-OAR-SE, in contrast, is based on a new true-score model (also see Rossiter 
2010), which is Observed score = True score + Measure-induced distortion + Rater 
error.  Measure-induced distortion is roughly what other true-score theorists refer to as 
“systematic error” (although one type of distortion due to an overdiscriminating 
answer scale does look “random”) and it is caused by the measure, specifically by its 
inadequate content validity.  Rater error, the final term in the new true-score model, is 
the same as “random error” in the old or classical true-score model, but rater error will 
be negligible if the measure is highly content-valid because a highly content-valid 
measure produces very little or ideally no distortion and raters are most unlikely to 
make mistaken ratings when using such a measure.  The Observed score from a highly 
content-valid measure should therefore be the True score. 
 Scope of application.  Churchill’s theory is “only applicable to multi-item 
measures” (p. 66).  Churchill advocates the use of multiple-item measures for all 
constructs, stating plainly that “marketers are much better served with multi-item 
than single-item measures of their constructs” (p. 66).  His recommendation to always 
use multiple items to measure a construct – a recommendation accepted and followed 
by most if not all academic marketing and social science researchers – inadvertently 
eliminates measures of the most commonly measured construct in the social sciences 
and marketing: beliefs, or as marketing scientists call them, perceptions.  A belief or 
perception is always uncontestably measured with a single item.  And indeed, all 
“basic” constructs – called “doubly concrete” constructs in C-OAR-SE theory – are 
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most validly measured with a single item.  This was suggested in the study by 
Bergkvist and Rossiter (2007) and confirmed in a reanalysis by Rossiter and 
Bergkvist (2009). 
Even further-reaching in C-OAR-SE theory is the realization that all 
“complex” or “abstract” constructs – the type of construct to which Churchill’s 
theory refers – are no more than aggregations of “doubly concrete” constructs (beliefs 
mostly) and these are each measured uncontestably with a single item.  This point 
was made most clearly in the article by Rossiter and Bergkvist (2009).  Take as an 
example the “abstract” construct COMPANY A’s SERVICE QUALITY AS 
PERCEIVED BY ITS CUSTOMERS, as measured by the now-standard 
SERVQUAL questionnaire (see Parasuraman, Zeithaml, and Berry, 1994).  Each of 
the 21 items in SERVQUAL is a belief and therefore is a “doubly concrete” construct 
that requires only a single item to measure it.  Item 21 in the 1994 version of 
SERVQUAL, for example, is the belief that “Company A has convenient business 
hours,” and this, like the other 20, is a single-item measure.  Service quality 
researchers then proceed – unnecessarily – to factor-analyze these single items, 
reducing the scores to five “factors” or “dimensions” that have no real-world 
applicability.  How, for instance, can the marketer possibly implement the 
SERVQUAL factor of “Responsiveness”?  Answer: Only by going back to the original 
single items.  But worse, the marketer would not realize that important 
“responsiveness” items may have been omitted because they didn’t “load” 
significantly on the “Responsiveness factor.”  This illustrates a major problem with 
Churchill’s procedure, which is that, like all classic psychometric approaches, it 
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assumes that all attributes are “reflective.”  The attributes of “Responsiveness,” 
“Empathy” and so forth in SERVQUAL are clearly “formed,” not reflective – formed 
from the most prevalent specific behaviors that make up the attribute.  For 
“Responsiveness,” for example, specific formative behaviors would include answering 
customers’ phone calls promptly and fixing problems fully.  Prevalent attribute-
forming behaviors – items – cannot be discarded merely because their scores are not 
“unidimensional” with the other items’ scores.  The reflective measurement model de-
validates multiple-item measures. 
In their reliance on the reflective measurement model, researchers have missed 
or preferred to ignore Armstrong’s (Armstrong 1967; Armstrong and Soelberg 1968) 
devastating demonstrations of the misleading nature of factor analysis.  In 
Armstrong’s two studies, meaningful “factors” were obtained using random numbers 
as inputs.  Armstrong revealed the input data were random only after the “results” 
had been plausibly written up.  Factor analysis and its principal components 
variation cannot be trusted (see also Ehrenberg, 1975) and this “data reduction” 
technique should not be used.   
Churchill’s procedure therefore has limited scope.  The C-OAR-SE procedure 
has no limitation, applying to all types of construct, including the most common 
construct in the social sciences – beliefs or perceptions – which are always measured 
with single items. 
 
2.4  Validity: Churchill vs. C-OAR-SE 
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 As is conventional in psychometric theory, Churchill separates validity into 
content validity, construct validity, and predictive validity.  In C-OAR-SE theory, 
only content validity matters.  Whereas Churchill concurs that high content validity of 
a measure is essential, he conceptualizes content validity inadequately and he 
unjustifiably assumes it to be achieved in steps 1 and 2 of his procedure (see shortly).  
Content validity.   High content validity of the measure is essential in 
C-OAR-SE theory and is the only requirement for a measure.  What, though, does 
“high content validity” mean?  Well, according to an informative study by Mosteller 
and Youtz (1990) the average person takes the adjective “high” to mean just over 
80% probability.  Quantitatively oriented readers, therefore, can take “high content 
validity” to mean that the semantic content of the measure must have at least 80% 
correspondence, or “overlap,” with the semantic content of the construct as defined.  
The semantic overlap could be quantified by anyone familiar with a thesaurus and 
with Osgood’s (see Osgood, Suci, and Tannenbaum, 1957) measure of connotative 
meaning.  Qualitatively, however, high content validity in C-OAR-SE is simply a 
matter of making a rational argument – an expert-judgment appeal to readers (see 
Nunnally, 1978, p. 94) that the descriptor “high” is warranted for the content validity 
of the measure.   
Content validity is defined in C-OAR-SE theory as consisting of two parts: 
item-content validity (which means coming as close as possible to semantic identity 
between the content of the construct, as defined by the researcher, and the content of 
the question part of the measure) and answer-scale validity (which means freedom 
from measure-induced distortions of the true score caused by semantic confusion 
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when the rater is responding to the answer part of the measure).  This two-part 
definition of content validity is unique to C-OAR-SE. 
 Construct validity.  So-called “construct validity” in Churchill’s theory, as in 
Nunnally’s, is seen as separate from, and apparently more important than, content 
validity.  (Churchill states, on p. 70, that a measure that is content-valid “may or 
may not produce a measure which has construct validity.”)  Churchill, and Nunnally, 
advocate the usual statistical psychometric approach to establishing construct 
validity, which is Campbell and Fiske’s (1959) multitrait-multimethod, or MTMM, 
analysis.  But MTMM analysis focuses on the scores from measures.  In MTMM, 
“convergent validity” and “discriminant validity” are claimed for the measure 
without considering the construct (see the structure-of-measurement model in Figure 1 
earlier).  By ignoring the measure’s correspondence with the construct, MTMM 
analysis therefore fails to consider the measure’s content validity. 
Not revealed by psychometricians is that the very term “construct validity” is 
a logical impossibility – a misnomer.  Nunnally (1978) appears to realize the illogic 
(see p. 109) but ignores it and Churchill (1979) obviously does not realize it because in 
his article he elevates “construct validity” over all other forms of validity.  But one 
can never validate a construct.  A construct is always just a subjective theoretical 
definition – a matter of opinion, not provable fact.  A construct can be “reasonable or 
unreasonable” (in its definition) but it can’t be “true or false” (validated). 
Validity refers only to a measure: it is the extent to which a measure “measures 
what it is supposed to measure” (a definition attributed to Kelley 1927; and see 
almost any social science research textbook for acknowledgement that this is the real 
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meaning of “validity” – followed by most textbook writers’ immediate departures 
into other “psychometric” meanings of the term!).  What the measure is supposed to 
measure is the construct.  A measure has high validity – high truth value – only if its 
content closely represents the content of the defined construct. 
Predictive validity.  Churchill further postulates that predictive validity is 
important to establish for a measure.  In his theory, Churchill appears to regard 
predictive validity as essential (see his discussion, on p. 72 of his 1979 article, of 
whether a measure “behaves as expected”).  However, predictive validity can at most 
be desirable, not essential.  Predictive validity cannot logically be essential because 
validity, by definition, is internal to the measure, and so validity cannot be 
established “externally” by showing that scores on the measure predict those from 
another measure. 
Churchill also misses Nunnally’s observation (1978, p. 91) that predictive 
validity applies only to measures of predictor constructs.  Measures of criterion 
constructs can be validated only in terms of their content validity. 
 Predictive validity is also much more complicated to establish than Churchill 
realizes, because it requires comparison of the observed correlation (called the 
“validity coefficient”; see Cronbach 1961) with an estimate of the population 
correlation between scores on the predictor measure and scores on the criterion 
measure (see Rossiter 2002b, pp. 327-328, and also see the study by Rossiter and 
Bergkvist 2009 in which two population correlations are estimated). 
Nomological validity.  So-called “nomological” or “theoretical network” 
validity (the main rationale for “structural equation modeling” – see Bagozzi 1994) is 
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just another form of predictive validity.  Nomological validity, too, is merely desirable, 
not essential, for a measure.    
 
2.5  Reliability: Churchill vs. C-OAR-SE  
 There are two principal types of reliability written about in the measurement 
literature: test-retest reliability, or stability, which applies to all measures, and 
internal-consistency reliability, which applies only to multiple-item measures.  Both 
forms of reliability are defined by psychometricians as the absence of “random error” 
(i.e., rater error) and thereby adhere to the old true-score model.  Both forms ignore 
possible “systematic error” caused by the measure – that is, measure-induced distortion 
– which is a key term in the new true-score model presented earlier. 
 Test-retest reliability.  Churchill states categorically that test-retest reliability 
“should not be used” (p. 70).  This type of reliability was also dismissed by Rossiter in 
the initial version of C-OAR-SE (2002b, p. 328).  Both theorists’ reason for rejecting 
test-retest reliability was that even a totally non-valid measure could produce highly 
similar scores on the retest.  However, in the new version of C-OAR-SE theory (here, 
and in Rossiter, 2010) it is recognized that the converse does not hold.  The measure 
must produce stable scores when readministered to the same respondents over a short 
retest interval, otherwise the results from any one-off empirical study using the 
measure cannot be trusted.  Highly stable test-retest scores are guaranteed only for a 
measure that has high item-content validity and high answer-scale validity – that is, 
high overall content validity. 
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 Internal-consistency reliability.  Churchill puts the entire emphasis in his theory 
of reliability on internal-consistency reliability.  Internal-consistency (of scores from a 
multiple-item measure) is invariably assessed by calculating Cronbach’s (1951) 
coefficient alpha, symbolized α.  In the original C-OAR-SE article, Rossiter (2002b) 
supported the use of coefficient α – preceded by the use of Revelle’s little-known 
(1979) coefficient β – in two of the six cells of the theory.  These were the cells in 
which a “reflective attribute,” which Rossiter (2002b) called an eliciting attribute, is 
part of the construct.  The most radical update in C-OAR-SE theory (here, and see 
Rossiter, 2010) is to reject the “reflective” model (which means that all abstract 
attributes now follow the “formative” model).  This change also makes internal 
consistency – and with it the psychometric idea of unidimensionality – unnecessary 
and indeed harmful.  The harmful aspect is that the attainment of high internal 
consistency always lowers the content validity of the measure.     
 The new proposition in C-OAR-SE that all abstract attributes follow the 
formative model – that is, that the total abstract attribute score is formed from its 
attribute component scores – is radical given that several leading theorists (e.g., 
Borsboom, 2005) do not regard the “formative” approach to be legitimate 
“measurement” (because they cling to the unnecessary psychometric concept of 
“unidimensionality” – see Rossiter, 2010, for a critique of this concept).  The new 
proposition therefore requires some justification.  The argument is twofold.   
 First, all abstract attributes (an abstract attribute has more than one clear 
meaning) must be classified on the basis of theory as either a formed, achieved 
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attribute or an eliciting, dispositional attribute.  The classification cannot be made 
empirically, contrary to the approach advocated by psychometricians such as 
Diamantopoulos and Sigauw (2006) and see Rossiter (2008) for a thorough 
dismantling of their empirical approach.  The majority of abstract attributes in 
marketing are formed.  MARKET ORIENTATION, SERVICE QUALITY, and 
CUSTOMER BRAND EQUITY are major examples of “formative” constructs that 
are invariably measured wrongly as “reflective” (you can tell this easily if “factor 
analysis” or alternatively “principal components analysis,” the favored statistical tool 
of psychometricians, is mentioned in the measure-development section of the article).  
All three JM articles critiqued later in this article make this mistake of imposing the 
reflective measurement model on the measure of their new construct.  Very few 
abstract attributes in marketing are genuinely “eliciting,” or “dispositional,” in that 
they are something internal (to the company or to the person) that causes (mental or 
overt) behavioral responses.  CORPORATE VALUES and INDIVIDUAL 
PERSONALITY TRAITS are among the rare examples of dispositional attributes. 
 Second – and here’s the more subtle argument – even though the component 
behaviors are caused, or “reflected out,” by the dispositional attribute, they cannot be 
“sampled randomly” as assumed in the notion of “domain sampling” which underlies 
the reflective measurement model.  Instead, the component behaviors must be in the 
measure, as items, by definition.  This argument is well illustrated by carefully 
considering the nature of the attribute called MARKET ORIENTATION, which 
Narver and Slater (1990) defined as consisting of five components: Customer 
orientation, Competitor orientation, Interfunctional orientation, Long-term 
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orientation, and Profitability orientation.  In the initial C-OAR-SE article, Rossiter 
(2002b) argued that MARKET ORIENTATION is a formed attribute – being 
something that the COMPANY achieves.  If so, all five components must be 
represented in the measurement items (whether the five components should be 
equally or differentially “weighted” is another decision – a theoretical, not an 
empirical, decision).  However, it could alternatively be argued, in the up-front theory 
section of the researchers’ article, that MARKET ORIENTATION is a disposition – a 
“company trait” if you like – that manifests itself or “reflects out” on the five sets of 
component behaviors.  If so, again all five components must be represented in the 
measurement items because that is how the MARKET ORIENTATION attribute is 
defined conceptually.  (By the way, no MARKET ORIENTATION researcher from 
Narver and Slater to the present has defined it this way – as a corporate disposition or 
“company trait.”)  But what is not realized by later researchers is that Narver and 
Slater (1990) imposed a reflective measurement model on the scores from their 
original large list of conforming to the five components items and dropped two of the 
components, Long-term orientation and Profit orientation, from the final measure 
because neither resulted in an “internally consistent” (by coefficient alpha) “factor.”  
Their actual MARKET ORIENTATION measure represents only three of the five 
defined components: Market orientation, Competitor orientation, and Interfunctional 
orientation.  They and all subsequent researchers using Narver and Slater’s (1990) 15-
item MARKET ORIENTATION scale are thus using a measure that does not 
correspond semantically with the construct definition.  Adoption of the C-OAR-SE 
method by later researchers (it was published in 2002, well after Narver and Slater’s 
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1990 article) would have prevented this major content omission because C-OAR-SE, 
as made clear by the C → M → S model earlier, is all about content validity, which 
requires high semantic correspondence between the construct and the measure.  No 
matter whether the MARKET ORIENTATION attribute was conceptualized as 
“formed” or “reflective,” all five components would be properly represented in the 
measure if the C-OAR-SE procedure were followed. 
 When you think about it, therefore, all abstract attributes are formed from a 
measurement standpoint (formed from their predefined components).  The radical 
“fallout” from careful thought is that the reflective measurement model is entirely 
misleading and should be abandoned. 
 Precision reliability.  C-OAR-SE theory adds another form of reliability much 
valued by social science practitioners: precision-of-score reliability (abbreviated as 
precision reliability in the comparison table).  Churchill (1979) hints at this form of 
reliability when he dismisses single-item measures.  His argument is that the usual 
seven-step rating scale accompanying a single-item measure produces imprecise scores 
because “the same scale position is unlikely to be checked in successive 
administrations” (p. 66).  This may be true but this is test-retest (un)reliability, not 
precision reliability. 
In C-OAR-SE theory, precision reliability is much closer to what practitioners 
know to be a very important applied consideration, which is the confidence that can 
be placed in an observed score.  “Precision” in this particular meaning of reliability 
depends mainly on the sample size of observations and therefore can be estimated 
closely enough for practical purposes from “lookup” tables which give generalized 
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95% confidence intervals for various sample sizes (see Rossiter and Percy 1987; 
Rossiter and Percy 1997; Rossiter and Bellman 2005; and Rossiter, 2010).  These 
lookup tables are what opinion pollsters use in newspaper reports and sometimes in 
TV reports to predict elections and if the precision in lookup tables is accurate enough 
for measuring important societal and political knowledge it is surely good enough for 
assessing the incidence of marketing knowledge. 
All precision estimates depend on using content-valid measures in the first 
place.  If the measures are highly content-valid, then the statistical precision of scores 
derived from them becomes relevant for proper interpretation of the findings. 
 
2.6  Step-by-step comparison 
 A brief comparison of the other major differences between the C-OAR-SE 
procedure and the six steps in Churchill’s (1979) measure-development procedure 
concludes the first half of this article.  The comparison is made on the basis of 
Churchill’s six steps. 
 1.  Define the construct.  Churchill – as all other psychometricians do – defines 
the construct in terms of its attribute only.  Churchill encourages this when he makes 
the incorrect (from the C-OAR-SE perspective) comment on p. 65 of his article that 
“…it is the attributes of objects that are measured and not the objects themselves.”  
In C-OAR-SE, the construct must be defined in terms of the object to be rated, the 
attribute it is to be rated on, and the rater entity doing the rating. 
McGuire (1989), in his “object-on-attribute” conceptualization of constructs, 
explains why a construct is necessarily “underspecified” if the object is not included in 
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the construct definition.  It follows that the measure, also, must represent the object 
of the construct – for example, the measure must include an illustration of the 
product if such products are usually chosen by brand recognition, or must include the 
phonetically appropriate name of the product or service if it is usually chosen by 
brand recall – see Rossiter and Percy (1987, 1997) or Rossiter and Bellman (2005).  
Object misrepresentation is one of the most common measurement mistakes made by 
researchers.  It is a mistake of low item-content validity. 
The attribute is only the second element of the construct.  It, too, must be 
correctly represented in the measure.  Churchill’s assumption that all attributes have 
multiple meanings and therefore are “multidimensional” automatically excludes from 
his theory all single-meaning attributes.  Single-meaning attributes are the type of 
attribute represented in the most common construct in the social sciences – beliefs or 
perceptions. 
The third element of the construct, the rater entity, does not appear in the 
measure, but must be included in the definition.  For example, service quality 
researchers should define as two constructs MANAGER-RATED service quality of the 
organization, on the one hand, and CUSTOMER-RATED service quality of the 
organization, on the other.  These two constructs represent the main service-quality 
“gap” that marketers must manage.  Most meta-analyses fail to identify the various 
different rater entities (see Rossiter, 2010, for examples of this).  Rater-entity 
differences are a major reason for reaching the unsatisfactory conclusion of “mixed” 
findings.   
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 2.  Generate items.  The second step in Churchill’s procedure is item generation, 
which always means the generation of multiple items.  In Churchill’s procedure, 
candidate items are either generated from qualitative “open-ended” interviews with a 
sample of raters, or else far more often they are borrowed from other researchers’ 
measures.  The second of these methods of item generation can now be readily seen as 
flawed given the near certainty that previous measures will have questionable content 
validity (low item-content validity) as well as unknown stability or test-retest 
reliability (low stability is largely caused by low answer-scale validity, which leads 
raters to mark the scale differently each time). 
The former method of generating candidate items by conducting open-ended 
interviews with a sample of raters is the “textbook correct” method (it’s correct even 
for a well-established object and attribute, because the rater entity might be different).  
However, this method is inappropriate for generating an item or items for a 
“psychological” construct – defined in Rossiter (2010) as a construct that is not self-
reportable by raters (examples in psychology would be the Freudian constructs of 
REPRESSION and PROJECTION; the increasingly popular construct in psychology 
and also in consumer behavior of IMPLICIT ATTITUDE; and the very important 
and inadequately measured set of constructs in both disciplines known as MOTIVES, 
noting that qualitative research was originally called “motivation research”).  The 
item or items used in the measure of a psychological construct can be decided only by 
the researcher, and raters are of no help. 
In fact, the final item, or items, selected for the other type of construct – called 
a “perceptual” construct in Rossiter (2010) because it is self-reportable by the rater – 
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must also be decided on ultimately by the researcher, although pretesting of item-
wording with raters is a good idea if the researcher is unsure of “consumer language” 
terms for the attributes. 
 3.  Purify the measure.  Churchill’s notion of “purifying” the (multiple-item) 
measure is a nice-sounding but misleading religious metaphor.  In the “purification” 
step, items are deleted from the randomly generated pool of candidate items if their 
scores fail to correlate positively with each other and with the total score on a 
“latent” and entirely artifactual, statistically derived “factor” emerging from the 
usually performed factor analysis or principal components analysis of candidate 
items’ scores.  The fact that an object receives high scores on, say, the item “Likable” 
and the item “Honest” (i.e., their scores are highly correlated) does not mean that 
there exists a real attribute labeled “LIKABILITY/HONESTY” – yet this is what a 
factor analyst will infer!  The five SERVQUAL “dimensions” of Responsiveness, 
Empathy, etc., are typical examples of the factor-analysis fallacy.  To make matters 
worse, further items may be deleted if the high-loading items fail to produce a high 
coefficient alpha.  This “purification” step is really a “contamination” step, because a 
multiple-item measure with poorer content validity is always the result when defining 
items are deleted or when their scores are summarized as an artificial “factor.” 
 There is no “purification” step in C-OAR-SE.  An abstract object or an abstract 
attribute means, of course, that a multiple-item measure must be employed, but the 
multiple items are “in there” by definition, having previously been selected – 
ultimately by the researcher – as corresponding to the components in the definition.  
Each item is based on prior certification by the researcher that the item has high 
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item-content validity, that is, high semantic correspondence with its predefined 
component in the researcher’s construct definition.  Scores from the items are never to 
be considered in assessing the validity of the measure (see the C → M → S model 
earlier) and thus no “purification” step is needed.   
 4.  Assess reliability.  As pointed out earlier in this article, “reliability” in 
Churchill’s theory refers solely to internal-consistency reliability (as estimated by 
calculating coefficient α from the items’ scores) and applies only to a multiple-item 
measure.  But, in C-OAR-SE theory, internal consistency is irrelevant and misleading 
for (scores on) a multiple-item measure because the total score on such a measure is 
always formed from the scores obtained on the items measuring the predefined 
components and these scores do not need to be internally consistent or at all correlated 
(although they usually will be, given that the attribute components are components 
of the main attribute). 
 In C-OAR-SE, there are only two types of reliability that matter.  These are 
stability reliability and precision reliability.  They were explained in the section on 
“reliability” earlier.   
 5.  Assess construct validity.  The first sub-heading under step 5 in Churchill’s 
(1979) article, the step describing “construct validity,” is “Correlations With Other 
Measures.”  In this section, Churchill goes into great detail to exemplify how the 
correlational theory of construct validity known as multitrait-multimethod analysis, or 
MTMM, an analysis procedure invented by Campbell and Fiske (1959), is to be 
applied to the measure.  However, a founding principle of C-OAR-SE theory, 
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represented in the C → M → S model (see earlier figure), is that a measure cannot be 
validated in relation to a construct by examining the scores obtained from the 
measure (in the form of the scores’ convergent, discriminant, or predictive 
correlations, coefficient alpha, or any other statistic).  In C-OAR-SE theory, the 
concept of “construct validity” is replaced by content validity. 
Content validity requires a rational argument – made by the researcher as 
theorist if a “psychological” construct and as an expert in colloquial consumer 
language if a “perceptual” construct, aided if necessary in either case by a couple of 
expert colleagues – that there is very good semantic correspondence between the 
construct as defined and the measure as selected (item-content validity) plus 
certification by the researcher, perhaps aided by a pretest with a small sample of 
raters, that the answer scale selected for the measure has very good “expressability” 
(high answer-scale validity).  C-OAR-SE measurement items require only a rational 
supporting argument attesting that they are highly content-valid.  Most researchers are 
evidently capable of doing this content analysis on their own.  Hardesty and Bearden 
(2004), for instance, estimate that multiple expert judges were used for only about 
20% of the approximately 200 new measures reported in Bearden and Netemeyer’s 
(1999) handbook of marketing measures – that is, in about 80% of cases, the 
researcher alone designed the new measure.   
 6.  Develop norms.  The final step in Churchill’s measure-development 
procedure is to “develop norms” for scores obtained from various applications of the 
measure.  As he points out (on p. 72), this final step is necessary only if the researcher 
wants to compare the scores of individuals – or the scores of individual objects, such as 
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a company, a brand, an ad, or celebrity or politician – with some population average 
score (the “norm”).  But few studies in the social sciences have this purpose and so it 
is not a necessary step.  Norms do have their uses, however.  Psychologists often use 
norms in research on individual abilities; well-known examples include the testing of 
GENERAL MENTAL ABILITY (called GENERAL INTELLIGENCE or “IQ” 
before the political correctness movement descended upon us) and the measuring of 
individuals’ psychological PERSONALITY TRAITS, which are assessed for the 
“clinical” population relative to their average levels in the “normal” population.  
Marketing practitioners sometimes use norms when they use marketing models (e.g., 
the BASS DIFFUSION MODEL, and the ORDER-OF-ENTRY → MARKET 
SHARE MODEL; see Urban and Star, 1991, and also Rossiter and Percy, 1987 and 
1997). 
 The greatest need for normative estimates for measures in the social sciences 
has been surprisingly overlooked.  Normative (i.e., population-based) correlation 
coefficients are needed for assessing predictive validity, because good predictive 
validity means coming close to the true correlation, not searching statistically for the 
highest correlation.  Only a few researchers in psychology have attempted to estimate 
population correlation coefficients.  Important attempts are for the correlation 
between ATTITUDE and subsequent BEHAVIOR (Krauss, 1995) and for HABIT 
and INTENTION as dual predictors of BEHAVIOR (Ouellette and Wood, 1998).  In 
marketing, Rossiter and Berkgvist (2009) have attempted to estimate the true 
population correlation for AD LIKING predicting BRAND ATTITUDE and then 
BRAND ATTITUDE predicting BRAND PURCHASE INTENTION.  All estimates 
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of population correlations rely on meta-analyses – and on the ability of the researcher 
to correct for problems with meta-analyses, of which differing measures are the main 
problem (another big problem is that college students are often the only rater entity, a 
problem pointed out long ago by Peterson, Albaum, and Beltramini, 1985).  The 
measure-difference problem would be solved if all social science researchers adopted 
the C-OAR-SE measurement procedure.  The rater-entity difference problem can only 
be solved by judiciously seeking out practitioner studies based on broader populations 
of respondents (see Rossiter and Percy, 1987 and 1997, for numerous examples). 
 
3.  C-OAR-SE critique of three JM studies 
 In this last part of the article, the main defined construct and measure in three 
recent articles selected from the Journal of Marketing, the most prestigious journal in 
our field, are critiqued from a C-OAR-SE perspective.  Most of the researchers 
involved are very experienced and have previous publications in JM and in other 
leading marketing research journals.  The critiques do not criticize the researchers – 
except obliquely for failing to adopt the C-OAR-SE procedure, which was published 
well before these studies were conducted.  The sole purpose of the critiques is to make 
readers realize that much of the marketing knowledge in strategic principles and 
empirical generalizations derived from studies using what Leeflang, Bijmolt, van 
Doorn, Hanssens, van Heerde, Verhoef, and Wierenga (2009) called “soft data” social-
science constructs is at the very least questionable. 
The critiques are organized in terms of five C-OAR-SE-based criteria that 
should be discernible from the first part of the present article.  (These five criteria 
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provide a useful summary of the C-OAR-SE steps – that is, the steps that should be 
followed in designing or choosing a measure.)  The criteria are: 
1. Comprehensive conceptual definition of the construct in terms of object, 
attribute, and rater entity 
2. Close semantic correspondence of measurement item, or items, with the 
construct as defined (high item-content validity) 
3. Good “expressability” of the answer options (high answer-scale validity) 
4. All major defining items retained in the measure  
5. Correct scoring rule applied to the scores 
These five criteria are hierarchical.  In decision-theory terms, they form an 
“elimination-by-aspects” decision rule, based on C-OAR-SE, for accepting the 
measure as valid – or, of course, for rejecting it.  
  
3.1   “Brand Experience” (Brakus, Schmitt, and Zarantonello, 2009) 
In their JM article of May 2009, researchers Brakus, Schmitt, and 
Zarantonello set out to measure a new construct that they called “brand experience.” 
1.  Adequate conceptual definition of the construct.  Brakus et al. (2009) defined 
the construct of BRAND EXPERIENCE as “sensations, feelings, cognitions, and 
behavioral responses evoked by brand-related stimuli that are part of a brand’s design 
and identity, packaging, communications, and environments” (p. 52).  In terms of 
C-OAR-SE theory, this is a mostly adequate conceptual definition because it specifies 
the object’s components (the Brand, its Packaging, its Communications, and its Retail 
environment) and also the components of the abstract attribute of brand experience 
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(Sensations, Feelings, Cognitions, and Behavioral responses).  Their definition fails 
only to specify the rater entity in the construct (which can be inferred to be ALL 
CONSUMERS AWARE OF THE BRAND, whether or not they are customers of the 
brand).   
 2.  High item-content validity.  The most serious problem occurs in the 
researchers’ measure of the construct.  Without realizing that they had done so, the 
researchers developed the most valid measure of the construct of a “brand experience” 
(most valid according to C-OAR-SE) in their pre-study.  Examples of BRAND 
EXPERIENCES (plural, note) obtained in open-ended questioning for some of the 
brands they studied are reproduced in my Table 3 (from their Table 1, on p. 56).  
These verbatim self-reports clearly are brand experiences. 
 
Table 3 about here 
 
However, these “sensations,” “feelings,” “cognitions,” and “behavioral 
responses” were measured in relation to the Brand-name only.  This severely biases 
the object component in the measure because it omits the other object components 
from the construct as defined by the researchers, which were the brand’s Packaging, 
Communications, and Retail environments (although the latter was obviously the 
object referred to in the open-ended question about Starbucks – see table). 
The rater entity for the pre-study measure was also biased.  The raters should 
have been ALL CONSUMERS WHO HAVE HEARD OF THE BRAND.  Instead, 
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the researchers interviewed only consumers who use the brand and therefore are more 
likely to have “brand experiences” to report. 
But the instrument that the researchers developed to measure BRAND 
EXPERIENCE for the main study bears no resemblance to the construct as defined.  
What the researchers did was to generate items that do not measure consumers’ actual 
sensations, etc., elicited by the brand (and by its packaging, communications, and 
retail environment) but instead measure consumers’ vague assertions that they had 
such experiences in general.  The 12 completely general items making up the 
researchers’ BRAND EXPERIENCE measure (see their Table 2, p. 58) are 
reproduced in Table 4 for the reader’s perusal.  Compare the completely general item 
content of the items in Table 4 with the specific contents of the open-ended reports of 
BRAND EXPERIENCES summarized in my Table 3 earlier.  Can you see the 
problem?  If not, try answering 12 BRAND EXPERIENCE questions yourself for, 
say, the Nike brand (“yes” or “no” will do for answers) and then compare those 
answers with the example answers for Nike in the previous table.  The 12 items have 
zero content overlap with the construct, which was defined as specific experiences.  
This is the “fatal flaw” in their study.  The main-study measure cannot be made 
acceptable by appealing, as the researchers did, to the “good statistics” it produces.   
 
Table 4 about here 
 
3.  Summary evaluation.  Brackus and colleagues did not in fact discover a new 
construct called “brand experience.”  They merely created an artificial general name 
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for specific experiences in the form of consumers’ beliefs and associations to brands – 
constructs that have been studied many times before.   
 
3.2  “Customer Need Knowledge” (Homburg, Wieseke, and Bornemann, 2009) 
 In their JM article of July 2009, researchers Homburg, Wieseke, and 
Bornemann introduced a new construct that they called “customer need knowledge” 
and proposed a new measure of it. 
1.  Adequate conceptual definition of the construct.  Homburg et al. (2009) 
defined the new construct of CUSTOMER NEED KNOWLEDGE as “the extent to 
which a frontline employee can correctly identify a given customer’s hierarchy of 
needs” (p. 65).  However, the theoretical background they supplied leading up to their 
construct definition concerns “the accuracy of interpersonal perception” (p. 65) and it 
is semantically inaccurate to label the attribute in this construct as involving 
knowledge.  A more appropriately descriptive label would be “Frontline employees’ 
accuracy of perceiving the customer’s needs,” and a shorter attribute-only label would 
be CUSTOMER-NEED PERCEPTION (restoring the clarifying hyphen so often 
omitted today).   
 2.  High item-content validity.  The “fatal flaw” in the researchers’ measure of 
CUSTOMER-NEED KNOWLEDGE occurs in terms of the next C-OAR-SE 
criterion: high item-content validity.  The researchers asked a sample of (travel 
agency) frontline employees, as well as each employee’s last customer, to rank-order 
six “needs” (reproduced verbatim in my Table 5).  The “need” items have low content 
validity.  To begin with, the attributes are far too vague and general (especially 
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“Brand,” “Convenience,” and “Price”) and then they are contrarily made too specific 
(and therefore unrepresentative) by their accompanying examples.  The example 
parenthesized in each item is actually a component attribute, and a full set of them 
should have been written as separate items.  For instance, the attribute called 
CONVENIENCE in any thorough study of services – and especially in practitioners’ 
studies – is always broken out into its components of Location convenience (for 
personal visits), Opening-hours convenience (for personal visits and telephone 
contact), and Perceived waiting time.  Measurement of these components requires 
three separate items, not one item as these researchers used. 
 
Table 5 about here 
 
Each customer was asked to rank the needs in order of “importan[ce] for you 
with respect to travel booking” and then the employee who had served that customer 
was asked to rank the same needs in order of their “importan[ce] for this customer” 
(p. 78).  The content-validity problem here is the ambiguity of the employee’s task 
(the wording of the task instruction).  It could be argued that the employee was not 
asked to estimate or “perceive” the customer’s needs but rather to judge what those 
needs should be (“importance for this customer”).  The employee’s task instruction 
does not unambiguously lead to a measure of the accuracy of employees’ perceptions 
of the customer’s needs and so the measure does not correspond semantically well 
enough to the construct as defined and will produce misleading results.  This mistake 
could have been avoided by pretesting of the instructions for the measure. 
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 The researchers’ use of low content-valid items (together with their use of 
ranked rather than rated items, discussed below) was undoubtedly responsible for 
their surprisingly weak findings with regard to the main construct.  Customer-need 
satisfaction is the strategic principle underlying the “marketing concept” (see any 
marketing textbook) and yet these researchers found that the salesperson’s 
CUSTOMER-NEED KNOWLEDGE was only weakly correlated with the customer’s 
rated SATISFACTION with the visit and, even more practically important, only 
weakly correlated with the customer’s rated WILLINGNESS TO PAY – that is, to 
pay a higher price for holiday tour packages booked with this travel agent (although 
the latter measure was half not-valid because two of the four items sought a 
customer’s willingness to pay a higher price for airfares, which is ridiculous to expect 
just because a particular travel agency booked the air travel).  The average 
correlation (i.e., the predictive-validity coefficient) for the employee’s CUSTOMER-
NEED KNOWLEDGE predicting the customer’s rated SATISFACTION was just r = 
.16, and for CUSTOMER-NEED KNOWLEDGE predicting WILLINGNESS TO 
PAY was also just r = .16.  While such correlations are statistically significant, they 
translate practically to very small effect sizes (Cohen, 1977, regards as a “small” effect 
size a correlation of between r = .10 and r = .29).  A practically minded marketing 
manager would likely conclude from these results that it is hardly worth training 
frontline employees to try to detect and fulfil “customer needs.”  This is not the 
conclusion the researchers intended, but their findings point to it.   
 3.  High answer-scale validity.  The third C-OAR-SE criterion requires good 
“expressability” of the answer options (see especially Viswanathan, Sudman, and 
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Johnson, 2004).  The researchers’ measure of CUSTOMER-NEED KNOWLEDGE 
fails on this criterion as well.  Employees and their customers were asked to rank the 
“needs” from 1 down to 6.  But not only does the ranking procedure fail to indicate 
whether any of the needs were absolutely important, it also precludes the likely answer 
that several of the needs are equally important.  The ranking method therefore both 
“underdiscriminates” by not using absolute ratings and “overdiscriminates” by 
forcing apart what could be tied ranks.  With either problem, the answer method – 
forced ordinal ranks – has unacceptably low content validity.   
 4.  All major defining items retained.  Were the main defining items included in 
the CUSTOMER-NEED KNOWLEDGE measure (the fourth C-OAR-SE criterion)?  
Again the answer is “no.”  The researchers obtained the initial set of items from 
qualitative interviews with three rater entities – MANAGERS, EMPLOYEES, and 
CUSTOMERS – but only the last rater entity, CUSTOMERS, was relevant.  (The 
purpose of the measure was to gauge employees’ accuracy in perceiving their 
customers’ needs.)  The gathering of “customer needs regarding travel agency services” 
(p. 59) as nominated by travel agency MANAGERS and by travel agency 
EMPLOYEES goes outside the construct definition.  The final list of six customer 
needs (see above) therefore cannot be guaranteed to include only the main defining 
items.   
5.  Correct scoring rule.  The researchers chose what might be called a rank- 
difference scoring rule to derive the employees’ accuracy scores (i.e., their “customer- 
need knowledge” scores).  The validity of ranking was questioned above but, this 
aside, the actual scoring rule the researchers employed was appropriate.  However, the 
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researchers described its computation incorrectly (on p. 70) as “the sum of the 
absolute differences between customer and employee rankings multiplied by –1.”  The 
maximum of the absolute differences between the two rank orders of six objects is 18 
and the minimum is 0 (and the midpoint, which might indicate 50% accuracy on the 
part of the employee, is 9).  These scores should be reversed (not “multiplied by –1”) 
so that a score of 18 indicates maximum accuracy and a score of 0 indicates complete 
inaccuracy.  The positive numbers in their Table 1 on p. 70 (mean scores of 7.8 and 8.5 
observed in their two studies) suggest that they did in fact use reversal scoring despite 
the wrongly reported formula, but this mistake may not be picked up by researchers 
attempting to replicate the study. 
More serious is that the mean scores of below and just under 9 suggest that the 
average employee’s perceptual accuracy in gauging the customer’s needs did not reach 
50%!  This disappointing result may be due to the low validity of the task requested 
of employees who, as noted earlier, quite possibly estimated the needs that the 
customer should have rather than does have, and also may be due to the forced nature 
of the ranking procedure. 
6.  Summary evaluation.  Contrary to the title of Homburg et al.’s article, their 
empirical findings lend very little support to the idea that managers should implement 
“the marketing concept.”  The findings seem to undermine the founding principle of 
marketing!  If uncritically accepted by readers of JM, they would result in the false 




3.3  “Corporate Culture” (Tellis, Prabhu, and Chandy, 2009) 
 In their JM article of January 2009, researchers Tellis, Prabhu, and Chandy 
studied the emergence of radical innovations across 17 of the world’s major 
economies, using as their main predictor a construct they called “corporate culture.” 
1.  Adequate conceptual definition of the construct.  Tellis et al. (2009) defined 
CORPORATE CULTURE as “a core set of attitudes and practices that are shared by 
members of the firm” (p. 6).  Whereas this definition is admirable from a C-OAR-SE-
theoretical perspective because it specifies the object of the construct (the FIRM) and 
the rater entity (MEMBERS OF THE FIRM), the definition includes a questionable 
conceptualization of the corporate culture attribute.  Surely, CORPORATE 
CULTURE refers to UNIVERSAL MANAGERIAL VALUES subscribed to by the 
particular ORGANIZATION(as defined, for example, in JM by Deshpandé and 
Webster, 1989).  The fact that others have used a similarly loose and unacceptable 
definition of the “corporate culture” attribute (other researchers are cited on p. 70) 
does not justify its adoption here.  The scientifically unacceptable practice of 
justifying definitions – and measures – by an appeal to precedence is all too common 
in the social sciences and especially in marketing.  
 The object of the construct of CORPORATE CULTURE was defined as 
FIRMS IN GENERAL whereas the researchers confined their sample to 
MANUFACTURING FIRMS.  They selected manufacturing firms presumably to 
give a higher chance of locating RADICAL INNOVATIONS – the product-based 
dependent variable in their study – and thereby excluded SERVICE FIRMS, which 
make up a majority of companies in some of the economies studied.  Also, the rater 
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entity in the construct was defined as MEMBERS OF THE FIRM whereas the 
researchers interviewed only “the vice-president for innovation or technology or the 
equivalent” (p. 9).  This particular rater entity is hardly a representative “member of 
the firm”!  The technology V-P would likely give a favorably biased report of the 
dependent variable. 
2.  High item-content validity.  The “fatal flaw” in the measure, however, lies in 
the low content validity of the components selected to represent the abstract attribute 
of CORPORATE CULTURE.  In a patently circular manner, the researchers 
confined their measure to attitudes and practices that tapped only the firm’s 
orientation toward the single value of INNOVATION, which overlaps greatly with 
the dependent variable that the researchers were trying to predict (see Table 6).  The 
attitude components in their measure of CORPORATE CULTURE were Willingness 
to cannibalize, Future market orientation, and Risk tolerance, and the behavioral 
components were Encouragement of product champions, Incentives through 
innovation, and a third vaguely labeled and mixed component that they labeled as 
Internal markets.  All the items in their CORPORATE CULTURE measure pertain 
narrowly to innovation.  Now look at the three items they used to measure the 
dependent variable of RADICAL INNOVATION (also given in Table 6).  There is a 
high degree of overlap between the measures of predictor variable and the dependent 
variable, which renders their “theory” predictively circular. 
 
Table 6 about here 
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What is simply not credible therefore, given this circularity, is that the scores 
on the six measured components of CORPORATE CULTURE had such small 
correlations with the scores on the dependent variable of what should have been 
labeled RADICAL INNOVATION ATTITUDE (this variable was subjective; the 
number of actual radically innovative products produced by the firm should have 
been used as the dependent variable).  The largest correlation was r = .25, for Risk 
tolerance (see their Table 4 on p. 14), and the correlations for the other five also 
favorably biased components ranged from .11 down to statistically zero (r = .06, n.s.).  
The zero correlation was for the firm’s having Internal markets, a component that 
was mis-measured – see the two sets of items, one labeled “Autonomy,” which has 
nothing to do with “Internal markets,” and the other labeled “Internal competition,” 
which does.  These results are hardly convincing evidence for even the limited theory 
that the researchers tested. 
What the researchers should have done to achieve a highly content-valid 
measure of CORPORATE CULTURE – more correctly labeled as 
ORGANIZATIONAL VALUES – was, ideally, to have generated a new C-OAR-SE-
based measure by qualitatively interviewing a cross-section of top managers.  For 
topic areas, they could use the comprehensive review of organizational behavior by 
Gelfand, Erez, and Ayean (2007).  Alternatively, they could have borrowed a more 
comprehensive extant measure.  The four-component, constant sum measure reported 
in JM by Deshpandé, Farley, and Webster (1993) includes as only one option in one 
component the item “Commitment to innovation and development.”  With 
Deshpandé et al.’s measure – which is closer to what C-OAR-SE would suggest – the 
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researchers would have avoided the narrowness of their study and its patent 
circularity.  
3.  The other C-OAR-SE criteria.  The other mistakes of measurement made by 
Tellis et al. are not trivial, although they pale in comparison with the major mistakes 
identified above.  There is the error of low answer-scale validity with the Likert answer 
scales (see Rossiter 2002b) used for all items for all the constructs, and so common-
methods bias may have inflated the already weak correlations.  There is the error of 
omitting defining items in the predictor measure of CORPORATE CULTURE, 
omissions made likely by assuming a reflective measurement model.  Finally, there 
are unjustified unequal weights of the components in the sum-scoring of the predictor 
measure due to the differing number of items used per component. 
4.  Summary evaluation.  Tellis and colleagues in their article did not 
contribute any new marketing knowledge.  Their study did not employ a valid 
measure of the construct of “corporate culture” nor a valid measure of “radical 
innovation,” and accordingly they recorded implausibly weak – and untrustable – 
results.  The lack of a contribution was due to inadequate construct definition and 
poor selection of measures – mistakes that would not have occurred had the 
researchers followed the C-OAR-SE procedure. 
 
3.4  Summary statement regarding the selection of the three JM articles and the generality 
of the critique 
It is necessary to reemphasize that these three articles were purposefully but 
representatively selected.  The three articles were purposefully selected because each 
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introduced a potentially important new construct – BRAND EXPERIENCE, 
CUSTOMER-NEED PERCEPTION, and what might be reconceptualized as 
CORPORATE INNOVATION CULTURE – together with a new measure of each 
that was intended to contribute new marketing knowledge.  It cannot reasonably be 
contended that these were unrepresentative, atypical articles.  All passed expert 
review and were published in recent issues of our leading journal. 
To further dispel the objection that I have been selective and that the 
majority of our measures in marketing are “okay,” I add that all other empirical 
articles based on “soft” measures of established marketing constructs post-dating 
Churchill’s (1979) article could be similarly criticized, as could similar articles in all 
other leading social science journals (those articles which post-date Nunnally’s highly 
influential 1978 book on psychometric theory).  I criticize – and correct – measures 
published in a broad range of marketing, management, organizational behavior, 
psychology, and sociology journals in my new book on C-OAR-SE. 
This is no “straw man” critique of current social science measures.  The 
“psychometric” measurement problem is pandemic, and a cure is urgently needed.  
The only cure is to adopt the C-OAR-SE method. 
 
4.  Conclusions 
 Social science researchers must get much braver – they must trust their ability 
to define new constructs (and properly define old ones) and to design highly content-
valid measures of them.  Amazing to many, all that is required is expertise in the 
colloquial language – the semantics – to be used in the measure.  To give a typical and 
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very topical example: Is it still appropriate to describe a person – or a brand – as 
“cool”?  Can the same meaning possibly be captured by the “hot-cold” measure in a 
battery of semantic-differential items?  And what is the semantic opposite of “cool”?  
It’s certainly not “hot,” which has an entirely different meaning when applied to a 
person today and yet another meaning when applied to a brand as the object.  
Researchers – especially academic researchers – fail to recognize the fundamentally 
semantic nature of measurement.  A Churchill-inspired researcher would likely borrow 
or invent loose multiple items representing a vague and usually undefined “domain,” 
put them in a questionnaire with faulty Likert answer scales, show that after deleting 
some items the scores on the remaining items correlate and produce a “high alpha,” 
and then claim to have captured the essence of “coolness”!  This is exactly what 
Churchill’s approach would tell the researcher to do – and the researcher is much more 
likely to have the work published by following it.  The C-OAR-SE researcher, in 
contrast, would pick up these “soft” attributes during qualitative research (see 
Rossiter 2009b; 2010).  The C-OAR-SE researcher would realize that a literal single 
item (e.g., “Brand X is cool.  □ Yes □ No”) is perfectly valid for the particular rater 
entity identified in the construct definition, then bravely argue for this measure and 
use it.  Hopefully the brave researcher will have become confident that this is the 
right approach by reading and understanding the present article. 
Also, what is not required for valid measurement of social science constructs is 
expertise in the substantive field.  Substantive expertise does not guarantee better 
measures.  The three JM studies criticized in the present article reveal this only too 
well.  Nor is expertise needed in quantitative methods and statistics – indeed, such 
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expertise might be considered a liability given that C-OAR-SE is a nonstatistical 
theory.  
 This last point is important to emphasize.  Measurement of “soft” (i.e., social 
science) constructs has been plagued by misplaced reliance on statistics – and 
especially psychometrics.  It is logically impossible for statistical manipulations to 
substitute for the fundamentally conceptual task of defining constructs and the 
semantic task of devising valid measures of them.  Yet all social sciences, including 
marketing, are being taken over by “scientism” (an exaggerated belief in the power of 
scientist-invented techniques, most of all statistical techniques).  One has only to 
peruse the journals of today to see this, especially if the articles are compared with 
articles on the same constructs written before the psychometricians took over.  The 
Journal of Marketing, from which the criticized studies were taken, is no exception.  
The best articles on “soft” constructs were written in JM by theorists such as 
Alderson, Bartels, Converse, Hunt, Kotler, Levitt, Levy, Stainton, Webster, Wensley, 
and Zaltman – without resort to statistics. 
 Social science knowledge, and therefore much of our marketing knowledge, is 
based on the presumption – and it is merely a presumption – that the measures of the 
many “soft” constructs involved in the knowledge are highly valid.  This means 
highly content-valid.  C-OAR-SE theory reveals that most if not all of our measures of 
soft constructs have unacceptably low content validity.  The problem applies especially 
to measures of abstract (multiple-item) constructs but also to unnecessary multiple-
item measures of concrete (single-item) constructs. 
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The discomfiting conclusion to be drawn from this article is that most of our 
measured knowledge in the social sciences, including marketing, is questionable, and 
that a not unsubstantial amount of this knowledge – especially the recent “Churchill-
based” knowledge – is wrong.  There is no doubt that our whole approach to 
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defined in terms of 
object, attribute, 































Based on old true-score 
model: Observed score = True 
score + Random error.   
 
 
Based on new true-score model: 
Observed score = True score + 
Measure-induced distortion + 
Rater error.   
 
Scope Applicable only to “abstract” 
(multiple-item) constructs. 
Applies to all constructs, 
“concrete” (single-item) and 
“abstract” (multiple-item). 
 
Validity Content validity: Acknow-
ledged as essential, but 
inadequately defined and 






Construct validity: Seen as 
essential, though should be 
called measure validity.  
Measure validity is wrongly 
tested empirically by 
examining convergent 
correlations and discriminant 









Content validity: Essential, and 
consists of (a) item-content 
validity – semantic identity of 
the construct and the measure; 
and (b) answer-scale validity – 
freedom from measure-induced 
distortions.  Established 
rationally by expert judgment. 
 
Construct validity: Meaningless, 
because you cannot validate – 
that is, prove the truth of – a 
construct.  You can only 
validate a measure of a 
construct, and then only by a 
rational argument as to its high 










Predictive validity: Essential, 
but not adequately explained. 
Predictive validity: Desirable 
but not essential.  Predictive 
validity applies only to 
predictor constructs.  Criterion 
constructs depend completely 
on high content validity.   
 
Reliability Defined as absence of random 
(i.e., rater) error in observed 
scores, following the “old” 
true-score model.  But 
operationalized only as 
internal-consistency reliability 
(coefficient alpha), which 
assumes a multiple-item 
measure. 
 
Churchill mentions test-retest 
reliability (stability) but 
advises against using it. 
 
Stability reliability: Essential, 
observed score(s) must be 
highly repeatable on a short-
interval retest.  
  
Precision reliability: Accuracy 
of observed score(s), which 
depends mainly on sample size 
and presumes a highly content-
valid measure.  Precision 
reliability should be reported 
for observed scores on all the 
main measures in the study. 
 
1. Define the construct Churchill defines the 
construct in terms of the 
attribute only.  This mistake is 
made by almost all 








C-OAR-SE construct definition 
requires specification of (1) the 
object to be rated, (2) the 
attribute it is to be rated on, and 
(3) the rater entity, who does the 
rating.  Constructs are 
ultimately researcher-defined, 
with no empirical assistance 
other than pooled experts’ 
judgments when the researcher 
is unsure.  
 
2. Generate items Candidate items are either 
borrowed from others’ 
measures (of questionable 
content validity and 
unknown stability) or are 
generated from qualitative 
open-ended interviews, with 
the item content mainly 
decided by the raters.   
 
 
Items must be decided on 
ultimately by the researcher.  
Raters’ inputs are necessary 
only if the construct is 
perceptual.  Raters’ inputs are 
not used if the construct is 





3. Purify the measure Items are deleted from the 
candidate pool if they don’t 
correlate with other items and 
with a “latent” statistical 
factor and don’t contribute to 
a high coefficient alpha.   
 
Items are never deleted from the 
defined set of items.  The items 
are based on a priori argued 
item-content validity, not 
derived from correlated scores 
ex post. 
4. Assess reliability Only internal-consistency 
reliability (coefficient α) is 
calculated.  Coefficient α is 
legitimate (though 
unnecessary) for a multiple-
item measure but meaningless 
for a single-item measure.  
Nunnally’s (1978) minimum α 
of .8 for a final measure is 
very often ignored and the 
measure is used anyway. 
 
Stability reliability is assessed 
by a short-interval test-retest.  
High stability (a “double-
positive” repeat rate of .8 is the 
acceptable minimum) is 
required for the measure. 
 
Precision reliability can be 
estimated from the sample size 
of raters in a particular study 
by using “lookup” tables.  
 
5. Assess construct 
   validity 
Construct validity is assessed 
by the multitrait-
multimethod correlational 
procedure, which does not 
relate to the construct itself.  
In any case, construct 




Churchill also recommends 
empirically testing the 
measure for known-groups 
discriminant validity, but this 
is just another form of 
predictive validity. 
 
Constructs are definitions, not 
empirically testable 
propositions. Only a measure 
can be validated (with regard 
to the defined construct).  This 
is content validity (high item-
content validity and high 
answer-scale validity) and high 
content validity is essential.  
 
Predictive validity (of the 
measure of a predictor 
construct) is desirable only, not 
essential.  Predictive validity 
requires prior high content 
validity of the measure and a 
population correlation estimate 
against which to assess the 





6. Develop norms Norms are misleadingly 
recommended as a solution to 
the problem of assessing 
whether you’re getting true 
scores from different answer 
scales.  Norms require a very 
large and representative rater 
sample – rarely attained in 
academic studies, which 
usually employ college 
students, a nonrepresentative 
rater entity. 
 
Norms are needed in the form 
of population correlations to 
properly assess predictive 
validity. 
 
Norms based on measures with 
low content validity, and 
observed-score comparisons 
based on a different measure 





C-OAR-SE CRITIQUE OF MEASURES OF THE MAIN CONSTRUCTS IN 














(Homburg et al., 
JM, July 2009) 
 
“Corporate 
Culture” (Tellis et 
al., JM, January 
2009) 
 
    
1. Adequate 
conceptual 
definition of the 





Yes.  Though their 
definition did not 
clearly specify the 
rater entity. 
No.  Construct’s 




No.  Construct’s 





2. Close semantic 
correspondence of 
measurement 





No.  The items’ 
objects and 
attributes 
completely miss the 
component objects 
and component 
attributes of the 
construct. 
No.  Attribute-
content of items too 
narrow and not 
representative of the 
component 
attributes in the 
construct.  Task 
instruction for raters 
ambiguous with 
regard to the 
construct definition. 
No.  Items 
selected so as to 





and the criterion 
measure’s scores 

























No. The bipolar 
Likert answer 
scales are faulty 
on the “disagree” 
side and 
“reversed” items 
cause rater errors. 
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4. All major 
defining items 
retained in the 
measure  
No.  Valid defining 
items in qualitative 
research are lost in 
moving to the 
quantitative 
measure. 
No.  The items are 
extracted from an 
unreported set of 
items from 
qualitative research 
in which two of three 
rater entities are not 
valid. 
 
No.  Factor 
analysis and 
coefficient alpha 
are used to 
wrongly delete 
defining items. 
5. Correct scoring 
rule applied to the 
scores 
Yes.  Sum-score rule 
(but a simple 
frequency count 
could have been 






Yes.  Rater-entity 
difference rule (but 
its computation is 
wrongly described). 
Yes.  Sum-score 
rule (but the 
components 
received unequal 
weight due to 
differing numbers 






SOME SPECIFIC BRAND EXPERIENCES OBTAINED OPEN-END IN THE 





 I love the touch and feel of the product 
 I am part of a “smarter” community 
 I exercise more because of the iPod 
 Makes me feel powerful 
 I feel inspired to start working out 
 I feel like an athlete 
 The store incites me to act – put on 





 I feel young 
 I feel stylish 
 It’s just great to drive 
 The symbol of my success 
 Smells nice 
 Visually warm 
 Puts me in a better mood 





 Makes me think about the precious 
      things in life 
 
 I feel more youthful than when using 








THE 12 COMPLETELY GENERAL AND IMPOSSIBLY VAGUE ITEMS IN THE 
“BRAND EXPERIENCE” MEASURE (BRAKUS ET AL., 2009, MAIN STUDY) 
 
1. This brand makes a strong impression on my visual or other senses. 
2. I find this brand interesting in a sensory way. 
3. This brand does not appeal to my senses. 
4. This brand induces feelings and sentiments. 
5. I do not have strong emotions for this brand. 
6. This brand is an emotional brand. 
7. I engage in physical actions and behaviors when I use this brand. 
8. This brand results in bodily experiences. 
9. This brand is not action oriented. 
10. I engage in a lot of thinking when I encounter this brand. 
11. This brand does not make me think. 
12. This brand stimulates my curiosity and problem solving. 
 
 








THE SIX “NEEDS” – LISTED VERBATIM HERE WITH THEIR CONTRADICTORY 
ITEM WORDING – IN THE STUDY OF “CUSTOMER NEED KNOWLEDGE” 
(HOMBURG, ET AL., 2009) 
 
1. Convenience (e.g., to have the least possible effort) 
2. Price (e.g., to book travels with the best prices) 
3. Service (e.g., the intensive consulting service by a travel agent) 
4. Brand (e.g., to book brands of well-known travel companies) 
5. Security (e.g., to have the security that the booked travel meets the expectations) 















THE SIX UNACCEPTABLY NARROW COMPONENTS IN THE MEASURE OF 
“CORPORATE CULTURE” AND THE SUBJECTIVE AND REDUNDANT ITEMS 
USED TO MEASURE THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE OF “RADICAL 







A.  Attitudes 
 
Primary-measure items 
     1. Willingness to cannibalize (3 items) 
     2. Future market focus (4 items) 
     3. Risk tolerance (4 items) 
1. “Our firm rarely introduces products that a
     radically different from existing products in
     the industry” (reverse-scored) 
 
2. “Our firm lags behind others in introducing
     products based on radically new 
     technologies” (reverse-scored) 
B.  Practices 
     4. Product champions (2 items) 
     5. Incentives for enterprise (2 items) 
     6a. Autonomy (2 items) 
     6b. Internal competition (2 items) 
 
 
3. “We have no difficulty in introducing new 
     products that are radically different from 
     existing products in the industry” 
 
Note: All items answered on bipolar Likert answer scales (wrongly scored unipolar as 1 = 
“Strongly disagree,” through 7 = “Strongly agree”). 
 
 
 
